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Property and the Body: Applying Honoré* 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues that the new commercial and quasi-commercial activities 
of medicine, scientists, pharmaceutical companies, and industry with 
regards to human tissue has given rise to a whole new way of valuing our 
bodies. It is argued that a property framework may be an effective and 
constructive method exploring issues arising from this. The paper refers to 
A.M. Honoré's theory of ownership and aims to show that we have full 
liberal ownership of our own bodies and as such can be considered to be 
self-owners. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jme.2006.019083  
 
Introduction 
The exponential rise in the use, and uses, of human tissue by medicine, 
scientists, pharmaceutical companies, and industry has given rise to a whole 
new way of looking at our bodies. Our bodies, along with their part and 
products, have acquired a value that is different from any traditional 
conceptions of value in the body. This change has been prompted by the 
commercial and quasi-commercial activities of the aforementioned people 
and industries. One of the results of these activities is that we are now, more 
than ever, concerned about questions of what can and cannot be done with 
our bodies and their parts and products. However, in order to explore and 
solve conflicts that arise in this area we need an appropriate framework 
within which to work. Since the new concerns surrounding the body and its 
tissues are essentially about issues of control and of ownership[1], one 
approach might be to consider each of us as a self-owner and our bodies, 
and human tissue in general, as being subject to property or at least quasi-
property rights.  
Self-ownership, and the concept of the body as property are 
sometimes rejected on the grounds that their acceptance might lead to 
practices considered by some to be morally objectionable. Such practices 
might include the sale of organs, the right to engage in prostitution, and the 
right to sell or give oneself into slavery. Additionally, self-ownership could 
entail claims that not only do we own our bodies but also our detached parts 
and products and could be taken to include not only our sperm and eggs but 
by extension our embryos, our foetuses, and even our children.[2] 
It is perhaps because of these seemingly radical end-points that one 
might want to dismiss self-ownership out of hand. However, considering 
the body within a property framework may be an effective and constructive 
method of approaching difficulties arising from the changing conception of 
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value associated with it. Of course a property framework is not the only 
way to explore the question of what can and cannot be done to our bodies 
and parts; another way might be within traditional notions of battery and 
trespass to the person. However, implicit in these approaches is the concept 
of a damaging act, and our consideration of an individual’s rights with 
regard to their body and our concerns over the use and control of our 
bodies, and its parts and products are not confined to considerations solely 
to do with damage. A property framework, however, can deal with these 
and is, therefore, a useful one. By including the body in the list of things 
which we now call property we place it within a normative framework 
which can help to identify what issues really divide us when considering 
dilemmas about the use and control of our bodies and their parts. 
The aim of this paper is to place the human body within a coherent 
property framework.[3] For reasons which will be elaborated upon below 
the model of property I use is that of A.M. Honoré[4]. Specifically I want to 
show that if, as Hillel Steiner maintains, self-ownership consists in us 
having “full liberal ownership of our bodies” (p.232)[5]; and if, as A.M. 
Honoré[4] claims, having ‘full ownership’ consists in us holding most of 
the elements of ownership, then we can be said to be self-owners if we can 
be shown to hold most of these incidents with regards to our bodies.[6]   
 
Honoré, Property Rights, and Self-ownership 
In trying to determine what ownership actually is A.M. Honoré set out an 
account of what he conceived to be the standard incidents of ownership. 
Through a review and analysis of the jurisprudence in property he arrived at 
a set of eleven rights, duties and other elements which when combined 
together give an account of ownership. These incidents of ownership are: 
1. the right to possess,  
2. the right to use,  
3. the right to manage,  
4. the right to the income of the thing,  
5. the right to the capital,  
6. the right to security,  
7. the right of transmissibility 
8. the right of absence of term,  
9. the duty to prevent harm,  
10. liability to execution, and  
11. the incident of residuarity. (p.165)[4]  
According to Honoré, for full ownership in a thing to be recognised, an 
individual must hold most (but not necessarily all) of these elements 
regarding that thing. 
This analysis incorporates the Wittgensteinian concept of family 
resemblance.[7]  Wittgenstein uses the example of games and shows us that 
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there is no single characteristic or group of characteristics that all ‘games’ 
have in common. There is, however, “a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities”.[8] In the 
context of Honoré’s incidents this addresses a major problem that is often 
associated with theories of property and ownership: that is that not all 
things generally considered to be property share all the same characteristics 
or sets of characteristics. Honoré’s approach is open and flexible because 
while each of the eleven incidents of ownership may not be applicable to 
things we consider to be property, each item within the ‘group’ of property 
will share similarities and relations with other items in the group. It is this 
openness in the theory which is its advantage over other theories of 
property and ownership such as those derived from Lockean natural rights 
theory.[9] It is also because of this that his theory lends itself to 
considerations of the body as property more aptly than that of other 
theories.  
 
Honoré and the Human Body 
Honoré’s conception of property, however, is rarely applied to the realm of 
the body and that of human biological materials. Indeed Honoré himself 
claimed that “a person does not either ‘own’ or ‘have’ his body or liberty” 
(p.180)[4] and that in the case of the self the parallel with ownership is not 
convincing.[10] However, when he wrote the original paper in 1960 
transplant surgery was in its infancy, stem cells had only just been 
discovered, and a multitude of medical technologies and applications 
utilising the body, and its parts and products were decades away. The 
development of these and the commercial and quasi-commercial activities 
surrounding them means that we necessarily have to think about and treat 
the body in a manner different to that envisaged by Honoré and his 
contemporaries.   
Björkman and Hansson went some way to incorporating Honoré’s 
incidents into a theory of bodily rights,[11] but they rejected Honoré’s 
application of Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance to the 
incidents of ownership. They do this reasoning that “it does not seem to be 
a specific enough tool for analysing ownership in modern capitalist 
societies”.(P.211)[11]  However, it is exactly this lack of specificity that is 
the strength of this theory of ownership, especially in its application to the 
human body. 
The adaptability of Honoré’s theory shows how the body might be 
considered property on some occasions or in some situations but not others. 
For that reason it simply does not matter if it is concluded that, for example, 
the right to the income of the thing when applied to the body does not 
include the sale of body parts. And it is not a fatal flaw if it is concluded, as 
Munzer did, that several incidents are missing in relation to the human body 
and its parts.[12] The theory’s flexibility appositely manages such 
perturbations. Such a formulation means that the theorist who is minded to 
reject self-ownership because of some of the radical extensions mentioned 
earlier, the sale of organs, slavery, etc., can still embrace the conception of 
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self-ownership set out in this paper. The normative framework of the model 
can help us to move on from abstract disputes about ownership itself and to 
identify what issues really divide us when considering dilemmas about the 
use and control of our bodies and their parts that have arisen in the new 
quasi-commercial climate surrounding human tissue. This, in turn, can lead 
to debate which is more focussed, more fruitful, and, ultimately, more 
likely to be resolved one way or the other. 
 
Applying the incidents 
If as Hillel Steiner contends, self-ownership consists in us having “full 
liberal ownership of our bodies” (p.232)[5], and if, as Honoré contends 
having ‘full ownership’ consists in us holding most of the elements of 
ownership, then we can be said to be self-owners, and to have property in 
our own bodies, if we can be shown to hold most of these incidents with 
regards to our bodies. This is important because if it can be shown that the 
body satisfies the criteria for property then anybody who believes in private 
property ought to be committed to treating it as such. Additionally, if we 
start from a position of self-ownership then this at least raises the 
presumption of property in the body’s separated parts and products. 
To investigate how Honoré’s incidents might relate to the body[13] I 
now want to look at each of the incidents and some possible applications of 
each of them. The application of many of these incidents to the human body 
might not be especially contentious and as such I will only briefly dwell 
upon these. There are, however, some incidents (or aspects of them) which 
could be seen as more controversial. These are those incidents which 
Munzer would deem to be ‘missing’ and which other authors might claim to 
be ‘inalienable’ or ‘non-tradable’.(p.212)[13] As explained above, however, 
Honoré’s theory because of its Wittgensteinian heritage can accommodate 
differences in the incidents required in order to call the body property. 
 
1. The right (claim) to possess  
According to Honoré this is the right to have exclusive physical control of a 
thing. He maintains that there are two aspects of this control: the right to be 
put in control and the right to remain in control. The notion of being put in 
control of our bodies may seem odd because there is the question of who 
puts us in control: our parents, the state, something or someone else? The 
answer to this may actually incorporate all of these. There are, it seems, an 
implicit set of rules which govern us from the day we are born through to us 
becoming adults. Within these as we grow and mature towards competent 
adults we are gain evermore control over our lives and our bodies, being 
permitted to do more and more. Whether or not we can identify the exact 
giver(s) of that control is matter less since it is clear that we do indeed gain 
this control. More importantly once in control it is embedded in this right is 
that others should not interfere (without permission) with this control. That 
society concurs with this is most clearly in evidence through our law of 
habeus corpus.  
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2. The right (liberty) to use 
Two interpretations of ‘the right to use’ are identified by Honoré. The first 
broad interpretation sees ‘use’ as encompassing ‘management’ and 
‘income’, however, these are more appropriately encompassed within 
incidents three and four. The second narrower interpretation “refers to the 
owner’s personal use and enjoyment of the thing owned” (p.168)[4], and it 
is this interpretation that applies readily to our bodies. While others can also 
use our bodies for their ‘personal use and enjoyment’, they can only 
legitimately do so with our permission. Even a kiss without permission 
constitutes a battery. 
 
3. The right (power) to manage 
This is the right to how and by whom the property can be used. This 
includes activities such as lending and contracting-out. Regarding our 
bodies this would mean that, within his sphere of management, the owner 
has the power to determine the terms of usage and any restrictions that he 
may put on his body. This incident can be seen as being intimately linked 
with the right to use. 
 
4. The right (claim) to the income of the thing 
The right intended here overlaps with ‘the right to use’ in that we can 
understand deriving an income from the property as enjoying the (use of) 
property. However, on a more legalistic basis we understand ‘income’ to be 
money received for work or through investments. Honoré describes this as 
‘a surrogate of use’ as we typically give up our own use of the thing in 
return for some remuneration. In terms of the body this occurs whenever we 
go to work and are paid for our labour. More controversially this can be 
seen as occurring where an individual sells their body or body parts or 
products.[14] An example of the temporary selling/renting of the whole 
body might be prostitution. 
 
5. The right (power and liberty) to capital 
This right consists of two aspects: the power to alienate and the liberty to 
consume or destroy the object. To Honoré the power to alienate is the more 
important of these. This power can be exercised during life or on death “by 
way of sale, mortgage, gift or other mode” (p.170)[4], and one can choose 
to alienate all or part of the object. Munzer maintains that this is one of the 
incidents that is missing with regards to the body,[12] but there are many 
instances where we do in effect alienate parts of our bodies and generally 
do not have any problems with this. We do this whenever we have our hair 
cut or clip our nails, it happens when we give blood, and it is indisputable 
that this is what is happening when a kidney is donated to a sick relative, or 
to a stranger. The most extreme interpretation of this right occurs when a 
person commits suicide. This can be seen to involve both destruction and 
alienation of the self. 
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6. The right (immunity) to security  
This is the assurance that a person will remain the owner of their property 
and will not be forced to give it up without adequate recompense. We can 
see how this is applied if we look at the example of compensation for 
wrongful death. This can be seen recompense for the expropriation to the 
next of kin or relatives of the deceased. It is compensation for the interest 
that they had in his body and any income he might have produced through 
his labour.   
 
7. The rights (power) of transmissibility 
This is the power to transfer ownership/one’s property rights in the thing to 
another person. This can be done in any one of a number of ways, for 
example, by simply giving the thing away, through the sale of the thing, or 
at death through one’s will to their successors. Applied to the body it would 
be the power to transfer my rights regarding my body to another by 
delegating proxies to take vital decisions for us regarding our bodies. We 
already do this on a small scale every time we abdicate some aspect of 
control or decision-making to others. An example of this might be when 
patients seek medical treatment. Given that they often have only limited 
knowledge of the different treatments for whatever ails them, they may 
defer to the advice of the doctor as to which is the most appropriate. A 
radical implementation of the power to transfer one’s rights would be the 
power to enslave oneself and hand over not some but all of your rights,[15] 
thereby losing the liberty to be the author of your own life.[16]  
 
8.  The right (immunity) to absence of term 
This is the owner’s right to an indeterminate length of ownership. It is an 
immunity from the expiration, without justifiable reasons, of one’s rights 
regarding the property. Long-lived rights are characteristic of property 
because what we now call property rights have evolved specifically to deal 
with things that are long-lasting such as land, buildings, and personal 
possessions. These things may even out-live their owner. To the individual, 
however, what can be more long-lived than their own body? And they 
would certainly want their rights of ownership to last as long as they do. 
 
9. The duty to prevent harm (disability) 
This is the duty of the owner not to use the property in a way that harms 
other members of society. Additionally Honoré maintains that the owner 
must also prevent others from using his property in a way that harms others. 
To paraphrase an oft used example ‘I may place my knife anywhere I like 
but not in your chest’. Equally I may not use my body in a way that harms 
others, for example, the use of physical violence towards them. 
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10. The liability to execution 
This incident recognises the legal responsibility of owners regarding their 
debts. They are accountable for these and may be liable to have their 
property seized in payment for them. Although perhaps not immediately 
obvious this does apply to the body. We are all aware of the threat of 
bailiffs if a debt remains unpaid. We can settle the debts in a variety of 
ways. These are most frequently paid either with money or by taking 
certain items of non-cash property away from us (televisions, furniture, our 
house, etc.) While we no longer have a debtor’s prison in this country, 
individuals can still be imprisoned for contempt of court if the refuse to 
make payments or pay fines following a court order. When this happens it 
is clear that the non-payment of debts does involve the seizing of our 
bodies. 
 
11. The incident of residuarity (liability) 
The last incident I wish to comment on is the incident of residuarity. This 
recognises that sometimes rights of ownership either expire or may be 
abandoned. Should this happen the corresponding rights become vested in 
or are exercisable by someone else. In certain circumstances this ‘someone 
else’ may be the state. In relation to the self this expiration of rights seems, 
most notably, to occur at death. Here our rights with regard to the self must 
necessarily cease as we can no longer be deemed capable of possessing any 
rights. The rights regarding our body then become vested in another – 
usually our next of kin. However, some of the rights in our bundle may 
become vested in the state, for example, in the event of a coroner’s post-
mortem being required. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I set out to place the human body in a coherent property 
framework. I did this because a property framework can help to identify the 
issues that divide us in the new commercial climate that the body and 
human tissue exists in. Specifically Honoré’s theory of ownership was used. 
Other theories could have been utilised but, not only is Honoré’s theory a 
better and more complete theory in and of itself, its Wittgensteinian 
heritage makes it an open, adaptable, and meaningful tool. This flexibility 
also lends itself to considerations of the body as property more aptly. It 
might be, as I would argue, that all of Honoré’s incidents are applicable to 
the human body in the manner set out above, but on this theory it is not 
incumbent upon everyone to agree fully with way in which the incidents are 
applied in this paper. The ‘family resemblance’ model accounts for and is 
able to deal with such differences allowing for the body to still be 
considered as property within this theory. 
Additionally the paper aimed to establish that if self-ownership 
consists in us having ‘full liberal ownership of our bodies’; and if having 
‘full ownership’ consists in us holding most of the elements of ownership, 
then we can be said to be self-owners if we can be shown to hold most of 
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these incidents with regards to our bodies. An analysis of Honoré’s 
incidents of ownership shows that the rights, duties and other elements 
required to give an account of ownership are indeed applicable to the 
human body. If this is right, then if we are to escape or evade the 
conclusion that the body is property, arguments strong enough to defeat 
Honoré’s incidents are required. The provision of such arguments is 
conspicuously absent from the work of those who insist on treating the 
body as if it (a) is not; (b) could not be; and (c) should not be property.  
So it seems that when it comes to my body I can say, with the support 
of the most complete theory of property that we have, that ‘I own that’ or 
‘that is my property’. We can each claim to have ‘full liberal ownership of 
our bodies’, and to have property rights in our own bodies. This also raises, 
at least, the strong presumption that we own our body’s separated parts and 
products. The implications of this are far-reaching, extending from simple 
rights of control over my person to the right to sell my body parts to the 
right to self-enslavement. They may also include the theses that we own not 
only our sperm and eggs, but our embryos, foetuses and children too. While 
exploring the nature of these hard cases lies outside the scope of this paper 
and is a job for another occasion, I fully accept that it is because of these 
that the applications of Honoré’s incidents as I have set them out may be 
somewhat controversial. However, it seems to me that a society which truly 
values individual liberty would not shy away from such consequences and 
the ensuing responsibilities which stem from the ‘full liberal ownership of 
our bodies’ that each of us ought to be entitled to. 
 
References 
1.  Moore v Regents of the University of California 793 P 2d (Cal, 1990) is 
a good example of how advancing biotechnology and the commercial 
activities surrounding such technology can lead to concerns over the control 
and ownership of human tissue. 
 
2.  For discussions of some of these concerns see Jansen, R.P.S. Sperm and 
Ova as Property. J.  Med. Ethics 1985; 11: 123-126; Joralemon D., Cox P. 
Body Values: The Case against Compensating for Transplant Organs. The 
Hastings Center Report  2003; 33(1): 27-33; Munzer S.R. An Uneasy Case 
against Property Rights in Body Parts. Social Philosophy and Policy 1994; 
11(2): 259-286; Nelkin D. Andrews L. Homo Economicus: 
Commercialization of Body Tissue in the Age of Biotechnology. The 
Hastings Center Report 1998; 28(5): 30-39; O'Connell Davidson J. The 
Rights and Wrongs of Prostitution. Hypatia 2002; 17(2): 84-98 
  
3. For wider reading on property, ownership, and self-ownership see 
Calabresi, G., ‘Do we Own our Bodies?’ in Health Matrix 1(5) 1991: 5-18; 
Cohen, G.A., Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1995); Gold, R.E., Body Parts: Property 
Rights and the Ownership of Human Biological Materials (Georgetown 
University Press: Washington, 1996); Harris, J.W., ‘Who Owns My Body’ 
Quigley, M. ‘Property Rights in the Human Body: Applying Honoré’, 
Journal of Medical Ethics (2007) 33 (11): 631-634 
9 
 
in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 16(1) 1996: 55-84; MacPherson CB. 
Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1978); Munzer SR. A Theory of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basil 
Blackwell: Oxford, 1974) and Waldron J. The Right to Private Property 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 
 
4. Honoré AM. Ownership. Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and 
Philosophical Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 161-192. The original was 
published in Guest, A.G. (Ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1961. pp.107-47. 
5. Steiner H. An Essay on Rights. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.  
 
6. It must be noted that this is an Anglo American / Western European 
conception of property and the body. 
 
7. This was not explicit in the original text but was suggested by Richard 
Flathman in ‘On the Alleged Impossibility of an Unqualified 
Disjustificatory Theory of Property Rights’ in Pennock R.J. and Chapman 
J.W. (Eds) Property Nomos XXII, New York: New York University Press. 
 
8. Wittgenstein L. Philosophical Investigations translated by Anscombe 
G.E.M., Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1968, p.32 
 
9. It is more usual for authors to use Lockean labour theory as the basis of 
their self-ownership theories. See Locke J. The Second Treatise of 
Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End in 
Laslett, P. (Ed) John Locke, Two Treatises of Government: A Critical 
Edition with an Introduction and Apparatus Criticus (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1964).  
 
10. Honoré admits that the reason for this may merely be a deficiency in 
legal linguistics as the body is not an “external material object”; however, 
he declares that it is more likely to be because “it has been thought 
undesirable that a person should alienate his body”. Ref. 4, p.180. 
 
11. Björkman B, Hansson SO. Bodily Rights and Property Rights. J.  Med. 
Ethics 2006; 32: 209-214. 
 
12. Munzer SR. A Theory of Property. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). Although he does argue that we may have limited property 
rights in our bodies. 
 
13. Here I use the words body and self interchangeably. 
 
14 .Examples of this might be hair, blood, semen, and kidneys. While it is 
illegal to sell all of these, with the exception of hair, in this country, it must 
be noted that there may be a difference between what is unlawful and the 
normative moral position on this issue. 
Quigley, M. ‘Property Rights in the Human Body: Applying Honoré’, 




15. As Steiner astutely puts it “it’s not that slaves have few rights: they 
have none”. Ref. 2, p.231. 
 
16. For a discussion on slavery and self-enslavement see Hare RM. What is 
Wrong with Slavery? Philosophy and Public Affairs 1979;8:104; Kufflick 
A. The Inalienability of Autonomy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 
1984;13:271; Kant I. The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991; and Mill JS. On Liberty and Other Essays. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
 
 
